Winfried R. Garscha, Austrian Research Center for Postwar Tials, Vienna

Overcoming Pan-Germanism. Patterns of Identity discourses in Austria, 1945-2005

Up to the 1930s pan-Germanism had been predominant in all three political camps that had come out of the old liberal movement of the Habsburg monarchy during the 2870s and 1880s (“Gross-deutsche,” Christian Socialists, Social Democrats). Before the Anschluß of 1938, only monarchists and communists rejected pan-Germanism.

The experience of being part of Greater Germany – especially the persecution of all forms of Austrian “separatism” by the Nazis – fostered the perception of differences, but even in postwar polls conducted by the U.S. occupation forces a vast majority regarded themselves as part of the German nation. Despite that popular sentiment most Austrian newspapers and two of the three political parties – the conservative People’s Party and the Communist Party – treated pan-Germanism as a kind of high treason, at least in the immediate postwar era. In the electoral campaigns of 1945 and 1949 the People’s Party made the Social Democrats out to be bad patriots because of their approval of the Anschluß in 1938 and called themselves the only advocates of Austrian independence.

During the Cold War, the confrontation “pan-Germans” versus “Austrian patriots” did not make sense any more. Being bad patriots was attributed to the communists and their “fellow travelers,” who opposed the integration of Austria into the Western block. Therefore, from the mid-1950s the only refuge of pan-Germanism was the Freedom Party (FPÖ), the electorate of which was mostly former Nazis.

In my paper, I will discuss the development of both pan-German and Austrian nationalism. Whereas pan-German nationalism put forward aggressive demands against neighbor states like Italy or Czechoslovakia, the predominant attitude of Austrian nationalism resembles that of other small Central and South East European nations: deploring historical defeats and denouncing the big powers for abandoning this poor defenseless victim. In Austria, this applies above all to the trauma of the Anschluß 1938, but also to the dissolution of the Habsburg empire in 1918; examples for similar “identity producing” traumata are those of the Serbs (Kosovo field 1389), the Hungarians (Mohacs 1526) or the Czechs (White Mountain 1620, Munich 1938).

Although in some periods, pan-Germanism and Austrian nationalism joined in order to push through common political issues – the most important example was the South Tyrol solidarity movement of the early 1960s – it turned out that pan-German nationalism lost support among the populace from the late 1960s. At the same time, an Austrian national sentiment – fueled by successes in sports and economy – became predominant. Also, the Freedom Party, from 1986 through 2000 led by Jörg Haider, had to recognize the deepening of Austrian national consciousness. Whereas in the 1980s Haider had called the Austrian nation an “ideological deformation” (the latest quote in this direction dates back to 1988), in the 1990s, he declared “Austria first!” and referred no more to German but to Austrian nationalism. In 1995, he even demanded from his party to leave behind “all elements of Deutschtümelei [hyper-‘Germanness’], because in the changed European framework it must be the most important issue for the Freedom Party to strengthen Austrian identity.” It was obvious that Jörg Haider knew that he could make the Freedom party a broad populist movement only by transcending the borders of the traditional political camps in Austria. A precondition for that was the “conversion” of the former pioneers of pan-Germanism to Austrian nationalism. But that did not require a change of the positive attitude towards the former soldiers of the Wehrmacht, including the men of the Waffen-SS. The admiration of the “warrior generation” is not only an indisputable component of FPÖ traditions: up to the 1980s, also representatives of the Socialist and the People’s Parties had attended commemoration meetings and manifestations of former Wehrmacht soldiers as guests of honor.

Although Austrian nationalism inherits a deep feeling of superiority toward the Slavic peoples of the former Habsburg monarchy, its most distinctive attitude is a whining self-pity, and persistent complaining about being misunderstood and deserted. The best “medicine” against this whining, retrospectively looking Austrian nationalism is to make offers to the populace for a new identity, based on a self-confident view of Austria’s history, and for a re-definition of the international role of the country, as did Bruno Kreisky in the 1970s. During his chancellorship all opinion polls showed an important increase of consent to Austria as an independent and “satisfied” nation. Pan-Germanism became an outdated political attitude, which had been shared, outside the small new-Nazi sub-culture, only by some intellectuals – among them some distinguished academics – and members of the “old guard” of the Freedom Party.

But as soon as international media attacked Austrians, as it was the case in the Waldheim affair, it was easy for political elites to revive the traditional self-righteousness and self-pity. Exactly the same old patterns of Austrian nationalism helped the coalition government of the People’s Party and Freedom Party in 2000 to gain support from a majority of the populace. The so-called “sanctions” of the other then 14-member states of the European Union – collective acts of diplomatic impoliteness towards the new Austrian government – fostered a broad, patriotically inspired nationalist movement that merged with traditional pan-German and Habsburgian prejudices, especially against France, as well as with a growing skepticism towards the EU.

For the neighboring states it makes an important difference whether Austrian nationalists regard their country as an outpost of “Germanness” – as it did Austrian pan-German nationalists from the 1870s through the 1930s – or as a deplorable victim of a resentful environment. The overcoming of pan-Germanism enabled Austria to re-define her role in Europe, and even an increase of nationalist sentiments, which complicates social life inside the country, is no longer dangerous for Austria’s neighbors.